### NO. COA10-1609

#### NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 4 October 2011

IN THE MATTER OF:
APPEAL OF: John C. Brooks from
the decision of the Wake County
Board of Equalization and Review
concerning the valuation of
certain real property for tax year

2008.

North Carolina
Property Tax Commission
No. 08 PTC 526

Appeal by taxpayer from order entered on or about 30 September 2010 by the North Carolina Property Tax Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 August 2011.

John C. Brooks, pro se.

Office of the County Attorney by Assistant County Attorney Lucy Chavis and Deputy County Attorney Roger Askew, for appellee.

STROUD, Judge.

On or about 22 September 2008, the Wake County Board of Equalization and Review ("Board") determined that Mr. John Brooks's property for account number 0061665 was valued at \$654,958.00. On 14 November 2008, Mr. Brooks applied for a hearing before the Property Tax Commission ("Commission") in order to appeal the Board's valuation of his property; Mr. Brooks contended his property should have appraised for

\$357,142.85. On 19 February 2010, Wake County filed for summary judgment against Mr. Brooks. The Commission granted summary judgment in favor of Wake County and dismissed Mr. Brooks's appeal; Mr. Brooks appeals.

## I. Appraisal Value

Appellant first contends that

[t]he Property Tax Commission erred County-Appellee's failing to reject the motion for Summary Judgment when Taxpayer-Appellant had demonstrated a prima establishing that case the significantly higher appraisal assigned the Taxpayer-Appellant's land value the County-Appellee was incongruous with the significantly lower price for which State had contracted to sell all of the contiquous surrounding and property immediately prior to the appraisal rendered by the County-Appellee in light of G.S. § 146-29.1(a).

For appeals from the Commission we "review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2(c) (2007). We have previously stated:

a sound and fundamental is a principle of law in this State that ad valorem tax assessments are presumed to be correct, but the presumption is one of fact and is therefore rebuttable. To rebut the [the appellant] must produce presumption, competent, material and substantial evidence that tends to show that: (1) Either the county tax supervisor used an arbitrary

method of valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegal method valuation; AND (3) the assessment substantially exceeded the true value money of the property. The County required to value all property for ad valorem tax purposes at its true value in money, which is its market value.

In re Appeal of Belk-Broome Co., 119 N.C. App. 470, 473, 458
S.E.2d 921, 923 (1995) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted), aff'd per curiam, 342 N.C. 890, 467 S.E.2d 242 (1996).

Appellant's entire case is based upon his own valuation of his property. Appellant apparently considers the sales price of neighboring land, but "assumes" the buyer "paid nothing for the six structures and four paved parking lots[,]" "assumes that the commercial property . . . is the same value as the residential property[,]" and "assumes that the aggregation of the 7/8ths of the block has no greater value than a single residential lot." (Emphasis added). Appellant's methodology assumes too much, and thus his approach is not a valid one to determine the true value of his property. As appellant has not demonstrated that "[e]ither the county tax supervisor used an arbitrary method of valuation; or (2) the county tax supervisor used an illegal method of valuation; (3) the assessment substantially AND exceeded the true value in money of the property[,]" id., we overrule this argument.

# II. Authority of the Commission

Appellant's next three arguments on appeal are regarding the Commission's authority "to exercise judicial tools such as 'Summary Judgment[,]'" the General Assembly's "delegation of authority" to the Commission, and the Commission's authority to "call[] upon its members to exercise legal knowledge" though they may not be "licensed attorneys." Essentially, appellant argues that the Commission did not have the authority to rule upon the property tax valuation as it did. However, our Court has previously recognized the authority of the Commission to make exactly this type of determination:

The duties of the Property Tax Commission are quasi-judicial in nature and require the exercise of judgment and discretion. the authority has Commission responsibility to determine the weight and the evidence and the sufficiency of the witnesses, to credibility of inferences from the facts, and to appraise conflicting and circumstantial evidence.

In re Marathon Holdings, LLC, \_\_\_\_ N.C. App. \_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_, 709 S.E.2d 451, 453-54 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Appellant has not presented any legal authority which supports his argument that the Commission does not have the authority to make the determination as it did in the order, and our Court recognizes the Commission's authority as granted by

statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-288 (2007). Furthermore, at his hearing before the Commission, appellant was given the opportunity to and did present his contentions and documents which we also have considered. Thus, considering all of appellant's evidence and any possible forecast he may have made future evidence, appellant's position has no merit appellant has not demonstrated any prejudice because argument will ultimately fail whether or not he is provided a full hearing and regardless of the sort of guasi-judicial or judicial body which could consider his case. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-345.2(c) (noting that we "review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error" (emphasis added)).

# III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and HUNTER, JR., Robert N. concur. Report per Rule 30(e).

COL. 21,20